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Introduction: Two Societies, Still Separate and Still Unequal 
“Our Nation is moving toward two societies, one black, one white—separate and 
unequal.”1  This quote from the Report of the National Committee on Civil Disorders (NCCD)—
commonly known as the Kerner Report—sent shockwaves throughout the United States, with its 
diagnosis of racial residential segregation as the catalyst for the urban riots that swept the 
country in the 1960s, when it was released on March 1, 1968.  The NCCD’s association of 
institutionalized racism with the riots that swept through the Watts section of Los Angeles, 
California; Detroit, Michigan; Newark, New Jersey; and many other American cities during the 
1960s was groundbreaking.  The Report explicitly admitted the role that the federal government 
played in African-Americans’ diminished life chances due to the federal government’s 
culpability in creating racial residential segregation.  It boldly declared:  
Segregation and poverty have created in the racial ghetto a destructive environment 
totally unknown to most white Americans.  What white Americans have never fully 
understood—but what the Negro can never forget—is that white society is deeply 
implicated in the ghetto.  White institutions created it, white institutions maintain it, and 
white society condones it.2   
 
Labeling racial segregation as a product of “White institutions” that “created it,” “maintain[ed] 
it, and “white society condon[ing] it” was a daring assertion for the NCCD.  Given the fact that 
many white Americans have chosen to view inequalities between whites and people of color not 
as part of a history of discrimination, but rather as the result of the unfortunate effects of a free 
market,3 this statement was quite progressive for its time because it underscored the privileges 
and inequalities that the housing market created.  It is from these privileges that white Americans 
have long benefitted ever since the professionalization of the real estate industry at the beginning 
of the twentieth century.4 
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Although the Report of the NCCD raised awareness of the pernicious effects of racial 
residential segregation more than forty years ago, housing segregation by race continues to afflict 
American society in the present.  According to John R. Logan and Brian J. Stults’ report entitled, 
“The Persistence of Segregation in the Metropolis: New Findings from the 2010 Census,” 
Segregated peaked around 1960 or 1970 and declined at a slow rate between 1980 and 2000.   In 
almost 400 metropolitan areas throughout the U.S., the average white American lives in a 
neighborhood that is approximately three-quarters white, a little less than ten percent black, a 
little more than ten percent Latino, and approximately five percent Asian.”5  Thus, while it is 
debatable how much racial residential discrimination may have abated since the enactment of the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968, which banned discrimination in the sale or rental of homes, 
criminalized redlining6, and made it illegal to use racial categories in advertisements for homes, 
residential discrimination has all but disappeared.  Some key questions that remain are: why does 
racial residential segregation continue to exist in American society, why have previous attempts 
to eradicate housing discrimination been unsuccessful, and what can be done to eliminate it? 
Several scholars including Arnold Hirsch, Kenneth Jackson, Thomas Sugrue, and 
Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, have provided detailed historical and sociological analyses 
to answer the first question.  Massey and Denton even provided a brief, but compelling answer to 
the third question.  One of the most effective historical works to deliver an in-depth answer to all 
three aspects of this question has been Christopher Bonastia’s Knocking on the Door: The 
Federal Government’s Attempt to Desegregate the Suburbs (2006).  Bonastia claims that the 
federal government had an opportunity to successfully address housing segregation when George 
Romney was the Secretary of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).  As 
Secretary of HUD, Romney’s chief goal was to facilitate “open communities” with increased 
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“housing options for low-income and minority families.”7  Specifically, Romney advocated for 
the application of affirmative action to housing desegregation efforts.8  However, Romney’s 
efforts offered a brief, but ultimately, failed attempt to eliminate housing discrimination due to 
President Nixon’s political machinations.  Drawing on Bonastia’s Knocking on the Door: The 
Federal Government’s Attempt to Desegregate the Suburbs as well as my own unpublished 
manuscript entitled, “A Model for America: Racial Integration in South Orange, New Jersey,” I 
argue that HUD can enforce the Fair Housing Act of 1968 by applying goals and timetables to 
track municipalities’ efforts to desegregate.  HUD can also use anti-steering measures to 
eliminate some realtors’ illegal practice of racial steering, and offer financial incentives to 
encourage diversity in cities and suburbs throughout the United States.  In order to answer the 
first question posed earlier about why segregation persists, it is imperative to examine the role 
that various actors, including state and local governments, the real estate industry, the federal 
government, and white homeowners have played in creating and maintaining racial residential 
segregation. 
 
America’s Investment in Racial Residential Segregation  
Arnold Hirsch’s Making the Second Ghetto: Race and Housing in Chicago, 1940-1960 
(1983) provides an important lens through which to view how particular individuals and 
institutions played historical roles in creating and maintaining the racial residential segregation 
that resulted in the “second ghetto.”  Local and state government’s involvement in creating and 
maintaining racial residential segregation distinguishes the “second ghetto” from the “first 
ghetto,” which formed as a result of white violence, racially restrictive covenants, and private 
realtor agreements.9  According to Hirsch, state and local governments’ urban renewal programs 
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had equally pernicious effects on African-American homeownership as did the federal 
government’s efforts.  Authorized by the Housing Act of 1949, downtown business interests 
united with local governments to enact urban renewal programs under the auspices of 
modernizing decaying portions of the American cityscape and re-attracting whites to cities in the 
face of the “expansion of the ghetto and deterioration of the central city.”10 Within the context of 
these programs, decaying sections of the city were condemned as “blighted,” and demolished so 
that more modern buildings could be constructed.  However, the real outcome of urban renewal 
programs was the disproportionate destruction of African-American neighborhoods.  Even the 
most “well-kept Negro area where the bulk of property is resident owned, its taxes paid, and its 
maintenance above par” was labeled as blighted and later demolished.11   
As a result of urban renewal’s disproportionate targeting of African-American 
neighborhoods for demolition, African-Americans were displaced from their homes, and were 
frequently not compensated with “decent, safe, and sanitary dwellings” to replace the homes that 
they lost. 12   The displacement of African-Americans from their homes without proper 
remuneration was made worse by the fact that the majority of urban renewal’s victims were 
working-class African-Americans.  They already had limited housing options as a result of being 
denied entry into the private housing market due to racial discrimination.13  Therefore, the 
combined impact of urban renewal and discriminatory housing market practices in limiting 
housing options forced many African-Americans to reside in even worse slums than the ones 
from which they were displaced.14  This explicit, racially based exclusion of African-Americans 
from financial opportunities that white Americans received resulted in many African-Americans’ 
confinement to neighborhoods that experienced the most deterioration and had poor housing 
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stock.  Consequently, African-Americans struggled to attain the same financial security that 
white Americans achieved by making a secure investment through achieving homeownership.   
Scholarship from Kenneth Jackson complements Hirsch’s depiction of the “second 
ghetto,” by further examining the role that discriminatory housing practices played in impeding 
African-American homeownership in suburbs.  Kenneth Jackson’s landmark Crabgrass 
Frontier: The Suburbanization of the United States (1985) continues Hirsch’s examination of 
inequality in the housing market.  However, instead of recounting this narrative primarily from 
the perspective of African-Americans, he chooses to examine how these discriminatory policies 
benefitted white suburban homeowners.  Specifically, Jackson explores the role that the Home 
Owners’ Loan Corporation (HOLC) and the Federal Housing Administration (FHA) played in 
facilitating suburban homeownership for white Americans.  These federal agencies concentrated 
their efforts in newly developing postwar suburban subdivisions.  Both HOLC and the FHA 
“guaranteed mortgages to twenty-five to thirty years and insisted that all loans be fully 
amortized” in an effort to “reduce both the average monthly payment and the national rate of 
mortgage foreclosure.”15  Additionally, the FHA mortgage guarantee decreased the amount of 
the down payment that buyers needed to place on homes to 10%.16  These measures were 
extremely beneficial to white Americans, and actually made it less expensive to own a house 
than to rent an apartment.17   
However, the economic benefits of suburban homeownership were not extended to 
African-Americans.  Jackson not only examines HOLC’s assessment of neighborhoods based on 
race, ethnicity, and neighborhood age18 as well as the role of the FHA’s Underwriting Manual in 
impeding African-American homeownership 19 , but also underscores the effects of these 
discriminatory actions in suburbs.  Unfortunately, he mistakenly believes that these policies 
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completely prevented African-Americans from residing in suburbs 20; later scholarship from 
Becky Nicoladies, Andrew Wiese, Mary Pattillo and others would undercover the existence of 
white, working-class and African-American suburbs. What is true about Jackson’s analysis is 
that denying African-Americans the opportunity to escape the impoverished conditions of inner-
city communities further mired them in a cycle of poverty.  Later scholarship from Thomas 
Sugrue describes the role of another important actor in inhibiting African-American 
homeownership: white homeowners.     
As Sugrue describes in his The Origins of the Urban Crisis: Race and Inequality in 
Postwar Detroit (1996), white homeowners believed that their economic interests depended on 
maintaining the racial homogeneity of their neighborhoods.  Having internalized the myth 
initially set forth by real estate agents, the FHA, and HOLC that African-Americans were 
“incompatible” with white neighborhoods, some white Detroit homeowners believed the 
misconception that “poor African American neighborhoods were the fault of irresponsible 
blacks, not greedy landlords or neglectful city officials.”21  Therefore, working-class white 
homeowners interpreted “poor housing conditions as a sign of personal failure and family 
breakdown,” because “housing was such a powerful symbol of ‘making it’ for immigrant and 
working-class families,” instead of the result of government-sponsored policies that kept 
African-Americans confined to the most deteriorated inner city neighborhoods.22  As a result of 
this extreme attachment to homeownership and concern over property values, white working-
class neighborhoods were often sites of the fiercest resistance to African-American newcomers.   
Even after the Supreme Court declared racially restrictive covenants unconstitutional in 
its 1948 ruling Shelley v. Kraemer, white working-class homeowners employed an array of 
methods to prevent African-Americans from moving into their neighborhoods.  These measures 
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ranged from violence against individual black homeowners23, to the use of white citizens’ 
councils and neighborhood civic associations to intimidate and harass black homeowners.24  
Therefore, white, working-class homeowners’ efforts left African-Americans with even fewer 
housing options, in light of the housing market’s drastic measures to impede African-Americans’ 
ability to own homes.   
Although Sugrue’s work provides an additional perspective to understand the formation 
of racial residential segregation, earlier work from Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton focuses 
on the continued existence of racial residential segregation.  Douglas Massey and Nancy 
Denton’s American Apartheid: Segregation and the Making of the Underclass (1993) offers an 
important analysis of the persistence of racial residential segregation as well as potential 
remedies to residential segregation after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  Massey 
and Denton contend that most housing market discrimination that persists after the enactment of 
the Fair Housing Act of 1968 exists in forms that are often subtle and difficult to detect.   They 
claim that racial residential discrimination continues to exist for a number of reasons, including 
whites’ reluctance to purchase homes in neighborhoods that are close to predominantly black 
neighborhoods25, the ability to flee rapidly racially transitioning neighborhoods for all-white 
neighborhoods26, and racial steering.27  These aforementioned examples of continued housing 
discrimination are the most difficult to detect and respond to because there appears to be no one 
solution to actions that are not in obvious violation of the law.  Additionally, both scholars’ 
analysis of subtle forms of discrimination does not completely preclude the few instances of 
outright discrimination against minority homeowners that continued well into the 1970s and 
1980s.  For example, “as late as 1970, examiners from the Federal Home Loan Bank Board 
routinely red-lined postal zipcode areas in which the percentage of blacks was rising.”28  
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Furthermore, a study of FHA lending patterns in Milwaukee reveals: “loan activity was high in 
all-white neighborhoods, fell to a minimum at around 55% black, and then increased 
somewhat.”29  Instead of settling for an analysis of segregation that treats it as an issue of the 
past, Massey and Denton’s investigation examines the causes of segregation’s existence in the 
present, and as a result, they extend their study beyond the scope of  both their intellectual 
antecedents and contemporaries.  Their study delivers a multifaceted answer to the question of 
why residential discrimination continues to exist in American society, and, as later sections of 
their work demonstrate, what possibly could be done to eradicate this oppressive system.      
The concluding chapter of American Apartheid offers a few potential solutions to the 
question: what can be done to eliminate racial residential segregation?  Some of the solutions 
that Massey and Denton propose include: HUD increasing its “financial assistance to local fair 
housing organizations to increase their ability to investigate and prosecute individual complaints 
of housing discrimination;” HUD’s establishment of “a permanent testing program capable of 
identifying realtors who engage in a pattern of discrimination;” HUD promoting “desegregation 
under affirmative mandate of the Fair Housing Act” through voucher-style programs that allow 
minority residents to relocate to different neighborhoods; creating a staff for the Assistant 
Secretary of Fair Housing and Equal Opportunity to help scrutinize “lending data for unusually 
high rates of rejection among minority applicants and black neighborhoods” for home loans, in 
accordance with the 1975 Home Mortgage Disclosure Act; and expediting the judicial process 
for violators of the Fair Housing Act of 1968.30  Overall, Massey and Denton propose highly 
feasible solutions to residential segregation.  However, in order to assess the true viability of 
their solutions, it is necessary to examine HUD’s failed attempt at desegregation at the national 
level and small communities’ efforts to combat residential segregation.  These endeavors, placed 
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in conversation with Massey and Denton’s proposals, provide solutions to achieving racial 
residential integration. 
 
Racial Residential Segregation as a “Modern Phenomenon” (1968-Present) 
 To more fully answer to the first question—why does racial residential segregation 
continue to exist in American society?—as well as answer my second question—why have 
previous attempts to eradicate housing discrimination been unsuccessful?—it is necessary to 
understand the ways in which Federal actors have been prevented from fully remedying the 
inequalities created by racial residential segregation.  A potential answer lies in examining the 
Fair Housing Act of 1968 and problems with its enforcement.  The Fair Housing Act of 1968 
made it illegal to “discriminate against any person in the terms, conditions, or privileges of sale 
or rental of a dwelling, or in the provision of services or facilities in connection therewith, 
because of race, color, religion, or national origin.”31  While the Fair Housing Act of 1968 was 
important because, among other things, it forbade discrimination in the sale or rental of homes, 
criminalized redlining, and made it illegal to use racial categories in advertisements for homes, 
the Act had serious flaws with enforcement.  For instance, the Fair Housing Act placed time 
restraints on when an individual could file a complaint with HUD.  The Act states: “A 
complaint…shall be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged discriminatory 
housing practice occurred.”32  Additionally, the burden of proof fell on the complainant33, and 
offered relatively minor penalties for perpetrators of housing discrimination.  These were poor 
enforcement mechanisms to prevent individuals and realtors from violating the law.  As a result 
of these poor enforcement mechanisms, the first Secretary of HUD was left with insufficient 
guidelines to create apparatuses of racial equality in the housing market, and subsequently 
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utilized insufficient means to attempt to rectify this inequality. 
 Given the relative weakness of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, it is unsurprising that the 
first Secretary of HUD, Robert C. Weaver, utilized mild methods to achieve equality for low-
income African-Americans.  Although Weaver’s tenure as the first Secretary of HUD only lasted 
two years, it certainly left a lasting imprint on the organization. Some of Weaver’s 
accomplishments as the first Secretary of HUD included constructing low-income housing so 
that low-income families whose homes were destroyed by urban renewal would have housing to 
replace the homes that they lost34 and implementing the Housing and Urban Development Act of 
1968.  The Act facilitated homeownership for low-income Americans through Section 235 and 
Section 236.  Sections 235 and 236 authorized the HUD Secretary “to make, and to contract to 
make, periodic interest reduction payments on behalf of the owner of a rental housing project 
designed for occupancy by lower income families.”35  While Weaver’s agenda challenged years 
of problematic policies that city, state, and local governments enacted, thus intervening in the 
cyclical poverty of poor, inner-city, minority residents, it served as a minor solution to low-
income, inner-city residents’ needs.  Weaver’s strategies only addressed the needs of low-
income, inner-city minority residents on a case-by-case basis.  Additionally, Weaver’s policies 
failed to address the larger, systematic inequality that created the “second ghetto,” and denied 
them access to home loans and made them targets of urban renewal as a matter of government 
policy in the first place.   
Another potential reason that Weaver’s agenda was relatively unprogressive in its 
objectives could have been due to the fact that he had little political capital to expend as a 
member of President Johnson’s Cabinet.  Not only was Weaver’s ascendance into the role of 
Secretary of HUD overshadowed by potential limitations placed on him as the first African-
American Cabinet member—given that his term took place in the context of the riots that swept 
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throughout the country during the mid and late 1960s—but also because President Johnson 
waited four months to appoint Weaver as Secretary.36  Johnson initially hoped to appoint a white 
male as the first Secretary of HUD instead of Weaver.  Johnson went as far as to express this 
sentiment to NAACP President Roy Wilkins, stating: “I don’t know whether we really can insist 
on putting a Negro into head of the urban affairs when we get it or whether they’ll [Congress] 
put somebody that will do more for the Negro than the Negro can do for himself in these 
cities.”37 Johnson’s reluctance to appoint someone who could do “more for the Negro than the 
Negro can do for himself,” implicitly reveals a desire to select someone who was not black, and 
therefore was more than likely white.  Due to the circumstances surrounding his appointment, 
Weaver may have interpreted Johnson’s hesitation to immediately appoint him as a lack of 
confidence in his abilities.  These conditions might have influenced Weaver to take a more 
cautious approach as the first Secretary of HUD.  Regardless of Johnson’s intentions, Johnson’s 
words became a reality, as it is apparent that Weaver’s successor, George Romney, had much 
more agency as a white male to aggressively eliminate racial inequalities in the housing market.   
Coming on the heels of Weaver’s moderate agenda, Romney’s efforts offered a brief 
window of opportunity for the federal government to effectively combat housing segregation.  
Assuming office almost immediately after Nixon began his first presidential term, Romney’s 
dedication to “mobilizing the thousands of voluntary agencies through America in moving on the 
problems of poverty and misery and disease in this country” was promising for the nascent 
organization.. 38   Compared to Weaver, Romney’s efforts as Secretary of HUD were 
revolutionary.  Unlike Weaver, Romney did not solely focus on providing low-income 
Americans in urban areas with public housing.  Nor did Romney limit his conceptualization of 
HUD to urban areas.  Rather, Romney advocated for a “metropolitan-wide approach,” to meet 
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Americans’ housing needs, and attempted to bridge the divide between cities and suburbs by 
setting an agenda to address both categories of residents’ distinct needs.39 
 
Romney’s Progressive Agenda 
Some of Romney’s progressive policies included providing public housing residents with 
rent reductions if 25% of their income is used to pay rent 40 and a $2.1 billion plan where funds 
were shared between cities and suburbs.41  The remaining funds that were not distributed to cities 
were earmarked for distribution to suburbs.  Other initiatives included creating a national 
telephone number operated by HUD in order to make it easier for Americans to report instances 
of housing discrimination42 and attempts to integrate suburban communities.  Romney’s latter 
initiative fell under the auspices of his overarching commitment to combatting racial 
discrimination in American cities and suburbs.43  
Romney’s previous experience as Governor of Michigan made him well prepared to 
respond to Warren’s hostile racial climate.  While Governor, he witnessed various clashes 
between blacks and whites over some African-American Michigan residents’ desire to reside in 
predominantly white neighborhoods such as Grosse Pointe, Grosse Pointe Farms, and Grosse 
Pointe Woods in search of better employment, education, and goods and services than their 
predominantly black, economically deprived neighborhoods could provide.44  These experiences 
provided Romney with firsthand knowledge of the intersection between housing and economic 
opportunities. 
Romney created a strong impetus for localities to voluntarily integrate by connecting 
urban renewal funds to municipalities’ compliance with the Fair Housing Act of 1968.  By 
linking federal funds to municipalities’ willingness to integrate, he acted in accordance with the 
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Fair Housing Act of 1968 and applied “affirmative action to implement the fair housing 
provisions.”45  In line with utilizing affirmative action to eradicate residential segregation, 
Romney decided to punish the predominantly white, working-class Detroit suburb of Warren, 
Michigan for overtly discriminating against minorities in its housing market.  He determined that 
Warren had issues with racial segregation because, by 1970, it was a community of 179,260 
residents with a black population of only 132.46  Relative to the greater Detroit metropolitan area, 
Warren’s population was incredibly racially homogenous.  By 1970, Detroit had a total 
population of 1,511,482.47  Its white population was 836,877 and its black population was 
660,428.48  In other words, blacks comprised 43.6% of Detroit’s population.49  Clearly, blacks 
were sorely underrepresented in Warren relative to the greater metropolitan region.  However, 
having a low black population was not enough to warrant HUD’s scrutiny.   
Warren had a history of blatant discriminatory policies in its housing market.  However, 
it briefly appeared that Warren would attempt to achieve racial and socioeconomic integration, 
after federal intervention.  In December 1969, an agreement was reached between HUD and 
local leaders, including Mayor Ted Bates.  The agreement provided Warren with $3.1 million in 
urban renewal funds in exchange for Warren establishing a fair housing committee and 
examining the housing options available to low-income residents.50  However, on May 27, 1970, 
Warren’s city council reneged on its previous agreement with HUD.  The council voted to reject 
a Federal requirement to establish a community board to address its racial and human relations 
problems, despite HUD officials’ warning that the community’s urban renewal grants were 
dependent on the adoption of this ordinance.51  Additionally, Warren began to weakly enforce its 
open housing laws and use its zoning and building codes to prevent low-income projects from 
being built.52  Therefore, when town officials tried to collect their last installment of $2.8 million 
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in 1970, HUD informed the town that it must alter its racially discriminatory policies before 
receiving the funding. 53  Unfortunately, Warren officials refused to change their policies.  
Subsequently, Romney acted on his warning, and suspended the community’s urban renewal 
grants.  Romney’s conflict with Warren would have larger implications during his dispute with 
President Nixon, but in order to further understand Romney’s tense relationship with Nixon it is 
important to first examine how the second Secretary of HUD’s efforts to apply affirmative action 
to the housing market were not completely original or uncharacteristic of the mechanisms that 
were being put into practice to achieve diversity during the 1970s.  
 
Affirmative Action in a Broader Context 
Romney’s intentions were very similar to affirmative action policies that were initiated 
by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) and Office of Federal Contract 
Compliance (OFCC) in order to diversify workplaces during Nixon’s Administration.  
Interestingly enough, with the EEOC and OFCC, it was a combination of employers’ initiatives 
and government intervention that made these affirmative action policies effective during the 
1970s.  The origins of employment-based affirmative action were rooted in the Supreme Court’s 
1971 decision Griggs v. Duke Power Company. 54 This case enabled plaintiffs to win suits based 
not only on intentional discrimination, but also on proof of latent discrimination through the 
underrepresentation of minorities in certain careers.  The Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 
1972 expanded EEOC enforcement by enabling the EEOC and individuals to sue employers for 
discrimination.  In response to the Supreme Court’s decision and the Equal Employment 
Opportunity Act of 1972, employers became concerned with litigation, and consequently 
expanded a number of compliance measures and programs.  Consequently, in 1974, almost 
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36,000 employers filed individual EEO-1 reports covering approximately 32 million people 
employed in the private industry in the United States.  These workers were employed at almost 
150,000 establishments and constituted one of every two private nonfarm workers in the 
nation.”55  Additionally, the percentage of EEO-1 Reporting Employers in 1974 comprised 
31.4% of institutions with less than 50 employees, 22% of institutions with 50-99 employees, 
27.9% of institutions with 100-149 employees, 10.6% of institutions with 250-499 employees, 
and 5% of institutions with 500-999 employees.56  Based on these statistics, a sizable percentage 
of employers in the private industry were using affirmative action plans to diversify their 
workforce in 1974.   
 
These policies were effective because they targeted minorities and women through the use of 
timetables, goals, and specific programs to provide them with equal opportunities.  The 
following table can be interpreted as a testament to employment-based affirmative action’s 
effectiveness [see next page].   
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From 1966 to 1992, the percentage of white women who participated in the private sector 
increased from 27.8% to 35.7%.  During this same time period, the number of black women who 
entered the private sector increased from 2.4% to 6.6%, the number of Latinos increased from 
1.8% to 4.1%, while the number of Latinas increased from 0.8% to 3.0%.  Furthermore, the 
percentage of Asian men in the private sector increased from 0.2% to 1.5%, Asian women 
experienced an increase of 0.1% to 1.5%, Native American men increased from 0.1% to 0.3%, 
and Native American women increased from 0.1% to 0.2%.57  Lastly, the percentage of African-
American men who entered the private sector increased less significantly compared to the 
aforementioned groups.  This negligible increase from 5.7% in 1966 to 5.8% in 1992 was likely 
due to the fact that many African-American men’s prospects for employment were connected to 
the manufacturing industry, and these prospects were harmed greatly, as America began to 
experience deindustrialization during the 1970s.  As a result of many African-American men’s 
dependence on the declining manufacturing industry, it is safe to assume that the decline of this 
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industry resulted in African-American men’s limited access to and less noticeable increase in 
access to private sector employment.  Although the increases in the percentages of racial 
minorities and white women in the private sector seem trivial, taken as a whole, the overall 
increase in these underrepresented populations’ employment serve as evidence of employers’ 
greater willingness to hire these populations, in an effort to comply with federally-mandated 
affirmative action programs.  Given the relative willingness of employers to comply with 
federally-sanctioned affirmative action programs, prevalence of affirmative action programs as a 
whole, and these programs’ overall subsequent success during the Nixon Administration, it 
seems odd that Nixon chose to sanction HUD for applying affirmative action to the housing 
market, impose a moratorium on programs not already approved by HUD58, and oust Romney as 
Secretary. 
 
Why Did Nixon Sanction HUD?  
As Bonastia points out, HUD’s relatively weak institutional structure compared to the 
EEOC, OFCC, and the Office for Civil Rights (OCR) within the U.S. Department of Health, 
Employment and Welfare Services (HEW) made it the most logical government agency for 
Nixon to dismantle. 59  Bonastia defines strong institutional structures, thus:  
The EEOC was a stand-alone agency with the singular mission to fight discrimination.  
Its legitimacy would hinge upon achievement of their objective alone.  The OFCC had 
the strong support of its parent agency, the Department of Labor, and a very specific 
mission: to ensure that federal contractors fulfilled the terms of their agreements with the 
federal government.  OCR’s school desegregation efforts became the most visible activity 
at HEW and thus the one on which political actors evaluated the agency.60 
 
Bonastia’s analysis is rather compelling.  A brief look at HUD’s program offices reveals that 
HUD’s offices were not dedicated to a singular mission, but instead that the agency housed 
multiple offices under its umbrella structure, some of which had competing missions.  For 
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example, HUD is the umbrella organization for both the Office of Fair Housing/Equal 
Opportunity and the Office of Housing, which oversees the FHA.61  Given the FHA’s history of 
denying African-Americans loans for homes and businesses, it is hypocritical for HUD to house 
a department that once contributed to the structural inequalities that it now sought to fight against.  
Ultimately, HUD’s competing missions resulted in disaster when numerous scandals began to 
plague the organization.   
A June 1971 report from the United States Commission on Civil Rights, entitled, “Home 
Ownership for Lower Income Families: A Report on the Racial and Ethnic Impact of the Section 
235 Program” revealed that residential segregation was pervasive in HUD’s central-city 
programs:  
[M]ost of this existing housing purchased under the program [section 235] was located in 
ghetto areas or ‘changing’ neighborhood[s] in the central city.  Nearly all was being 
purchased by minority families. In other metropolitan areas, to the extent minority 
[section] 235 buyers were purchasing new housing, it was located largely in subdivisions 
reserved exclusively for minority families… Most of the poor quality housing was 
existing housing located in the central city and nearly all had been purchased by minority 
families. Thus, minority families have suffered disproportionately from the abuse that 
have occurred under the program—the same abuses that have occurred in connection 
with other non-subsidized Federal housing programs that are operating in the central 
city.62 
 
While it is difficult to imagine how HUD could ignore, and in some instances, propagate 
residential segregation in urban areas, the report also provided damning evidence against HUD’s 
subsidiary, the FHA.  It continued, stating: “FHA officials, moreover, even though aware of the 
segregated housing pattern that has developed under the 235 program, have failed to take even 
minimal steps to change it, despite their legal obligation to do so.”63  Overall, there may have 
been as many as 1,340 cases of corruption in HUD’s programs spread across 10 major cities 
including New York, Newark, Philadelphia, Detroit, Chicago, and Washington D.C.64  These 
startling statistics support Bonastia’s theory that the FHA’s location within HUD as an institution 
that conflicted with HUD’s mission, and as an agency that had a history of racial discrimination 
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directly caused HUD to perpetuate the discrimination that Romney pledged to fight.  As 
mentioned in the U.S. Commission on Civil Right’s June 1971 report, congressionally enacted 
programs “allowed the FHA to do business in ‘risky’ locales that it had historically avoided,” as 
well as FHA appraisers profiting from realtors’ illegal real estate practices such as blockbusting 
was one means by which HUD inadvertently perpetuated these questionable practices.65   
 Despite its plausibility, Bonastia’s analysis is limited. A more credible and all-
encompassing explanation for Nixon’s actions towards Romney and HUD lies in Nixon’s desire 
to distance himself from liberal policies that jeopardized his chances of receiving support from 
white, working-class voters, who would prove essential to Nixon’s re-election in the Presidential 
Election of 1972.  Although he was very much a political chameleon and often expressed 
contradictory viewpoints, when forced to take a definitive stance on desegregation, Nixon 
articulated his opposition to civil rights policies like school desegregation and busing as a 
presidential candidate in the 1968 Presidential Election.  For instance, in a speech entitled, 
“Bridges to Human Dignity,” Nixon claimed that white America tried to “buy off the Negro—
and its own sense of guilt—withever more programs of welfare, of public housing, of payments 
to the poor,” which, he claimed did not work, and instead create a “dismal cycle of dependency” 
among black Americans.66  Furthermore, Nixon suggested the creation of various incentives to 
encourage private corporations to create social programs and business opportunities for black 
Americans that would result in “black pride, black jobs…and yes, black power in the best, the 
constructive sense of that often misapplied term.”67  Conversely in a September 30, 1968 radio 
address entitled “Order and Justice Under Law” Nixon appears to have reversed his commitment 
to racial equality.  More specifically, Nixon claimed that America was a “sick society” because 
“of what has been allowed to go on in America.”68  Nixon stated that crime and violence have 
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skyrocketed in America” during the Johnson Administration and that the only way to reduce 
crime and violence was to enact stricter law enforcement.69  The “crime and violence” to which 
Nixon referred was an implicit reference to the urban riots that swept through many major 
American cities throughout the decade.  These riots occurred in predominantly black 
communities and were carried out largely by black Americans.  Although subtle, this excerpt 
reveals Nixon’s his now infamous “law and order” stance, which implicitly equated the 
“criminality” of the rioters with all minority populations who resided in inner city communities. 
Therefore, a careful interpretation of Nixon’s language reveals his false connection between 
racial minorities and criminality; he more than likely made this connection to appeal to white 
suburban and white Southern voters’ racial anxieties.  But when pressured to do so, Nixon 
clarified his stance on racial equality.  He expressed his support for freedom of choice programs 
to allow school districts to decide the pace of integration as long as these programs did not 
encourage school segregation.70  In spite of Nixon’s temperate tone, his words masked support 
for racial segregation given that “freedom of choice” programs lack a method to enforce 
integration as required by the law.   
Nevertheless, upon arriving in the White House, Nixon adopted a more moderate tone, 
more than likely because the politics of governing differed from the politics of getting elected.71  
During the first two years of his tenure, Nixon enacted some of the most beneficial policies to 
impact black and low-income Americans.  These policies included: the Philadelphia Plan, which 
served as the model for affirmative action policies in the public and private sector; the Family 
Assistance Plan, which provided a minimum standard of living under the conditions that its 
recipients pursue employment; and the Office of Minority Enterprises, which facilitated black 
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business ownership and guaranteed that a certain percentage of government contracts are 
guaranteed to minority businesses.72   
Conversely, in 1970, Nixon’s actions towards civil rights took a sharp, conservative turn, 
as he began to shift his attention towards re-election, which was two years away.  A primary 
explanation for this change is political journalists’ assessment of the power that white working-
class voters had in the Presidential Election of 1968 and the continued power that they would 
have in the then upcoming Presidential Election of 1972.  Journalists like Kevin Phillips, Richard 
Scammon, and Ben Wattenberg examined the role that George Wallace played in the 1968 
Election.  Scammon and Wattenberg claimed that the Democratic Party was out of touch with the 
“mainstream of the American electorate, which was white, middle-aged, and middle class.”73  
Phillips made an even more compelling case for the Nixon Administration to adopt more 
reactionary policies.  Phillips’ book entitled, The Emerging Republican Majority, asserted that 
the wedge issues of culture and race would result in Nixon winning the majority of former 
Wallace voters in the Presidential Election of 1972.74  Additionally, Yale Law School professor 
Alexander Bickel’s February 7, 1970 article in The New Republic entitled, “Where Do We Go 
From Here?” made an equally important impact on Nixon’s pursuit of more reactionary policies.  
Bickel’s  article stated that there was no way to prevent whites, especially middle-class whites, 
from fleeing integrated schools in regions of the country outside of the South.75  Directly 
influenced by Phillips’ book as well as Bickel’s article, Nixon decided that his Administration 
should begin to downplay its prior commitment to desegregation as part of an effort to appeal to 
an increasingly conservative white electorate in the North and South.76  Subsequently, Nixon 
began to reverse some of his more moderate policies that aided racial minorities and low-income 
individuals.  For example, Nixon’s reluctance to revive the Family Assistance Plan after it stalled 
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in Congress serves as evidence of his political machinations.77  Additionally, Nixon fired key 
civil rights officials like Leon Panetta78 and transferred Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary 
Robert H. Finch from his role as Secretary to a relatively undefined role as a “White House 
Advisor” because of Finch’s aggressive support for civil rights.79  Moreover, he pressured 
Finch’s replacement, Elliot Richardson, to stop enforcing federal busing laws as a method to 
desegregate public schools and to “[d]o what the law requires and not one bit more.80’” 
Thus, Nixon’s targeting of HUD was merely an extension of his extremely calculating 
political agenda, including making Romney’s job increasingly difficult.  One of the various areas 
of conflict between Romney and Nixon emerged as a result of Romney’s plans to integrate 
predominantly white suburbs by race and socioeconomic status.  Nixon and his advisors became 
concerned with Romney’s agenda after he appeared before a congressional committee in early 
June 1970 to advocate for the placement low-income housing in other predominantly white 
suburban communities. 81   According to the article’s author and conservative political 
commentator, Kevin P. Phillips, Romney appeared before Congress without the White House’s 
knowledge or consent.  This fact was significant because Romney did not only violate White 
House protocol, but he also more than likely advocated a set of policies that the Administration 
began to oppose.  Similar to Phillips’ general predictions about the significance of race in the 
upcoming election, Phillips not only reported Romney’s actions, but also speculated about the 
impact that Romney’s actions would have on white, working-class suburban voters, who were 
increasingly important to Nixon’s future political chances.  Phillips claimed:  
Not only do Middle American suburbanites strongly object to the intrusion of subsidized 
low-income housing.  They deeply resent the fact that it is always their communities and 
never the rich liberal suburbs—Beverly Hills say, or Scarsdale—that are selected for 
school or residential experiments.82 
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This excerpt reveals another example of journalists, like Phillips’, ability to both report and 
influence the White House’s political machinations.  Keenly aware of this segment of his 
electoral base’s growing influence, Nixon moved quickly to attempt to prevent Romney from 
harming his chances of re-election.  Allegedly, Attorney General and close Nixon advisor, John 
N. Mitchell, attempted to halt Romney’s actions on Nixon’s behalf.  Mitchell suggested that 
Romney select another position in the Administration because his pro-integrative policies 
contradicted the Administration’s official agenda.83  Romney is reported to have questioned the 
Administration’s agenda, stating that the agenda “changes from day to day and hour to hour.”84 
Romney’s assessment was accurate considering that Nixon’s written policy did briefly 
support Romney’s agenda.  In the April 2, 1970 “Second Annual Report on National Housing 
Goals,” that Nixon was required to submit to Congress in accordance with the Housing and 
Urban Development Act of 1968, Nixon’s support for racial and economic integration policies 
was quite explicit.  Nixon boldly proclaimed: “One of the most serious constraints on the 
availability of building sites for low- and moderate-income housing is the opposition of many 
middle-class, white communities to the building of such dwellings in their areas.”85  He 
continued, writing:  
Community opposition to low- and moderate-income housing involves both racial and 
economic discrimination.  Under the Open Housing Act of 1968 [Civil Rights Act of 
1968], it is now illegal to discriminate in the sale or rental of most housing on the basis of 
race.  Strict enforcement of this and similar statutes will help establish an atmosphere in 
which discrimination will be the exception rather than the rule.  Nevertheless the fact 
remains that it is difficult, if not impossible, in many communities to find sites for low- 
and moderate-income housing because the occupants will be poor, or will be members of 
a racial minority, or both.  The consequence is that either no low- or moderate-income 
housing is built or that it is built only in the inner city, thus heightening the tendency for 
racial polarization in our society…All Americans, regardless of race or economic status, 
are entitled to share in those resources, and Government policies must be pursued to 
make freedom of choice residential construction an equal opportunity for all.86 
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This excerpt reveals Nixon’s support for enforcing the Fair Housing Act as late as April 1970.  It 
also underscores his acknowledgment of the connection between the strict enforcement of the 
Fair Housing Act and eliminating discrimination in order to provide Americans with equal 
access to housing, regardless of race and socioeconomic status.  Accompanying Nixon’s bold 
declaration was his echoing of Romney’s “metropolitan-wide approach” to meet all Americans’ 
housing needs and call to bridge the gap between cities and suburbs.  He advocated for the need 
to make central cities more appealing to both white and non-white middle- and upper-income 
families, improve housing in rural areas, and ameliorate the public transportation that linked 
cities and suburbs.87  Furthermore, Nixon proposed three solutions to eliminate the historical 
divide between cities and suburbs.  The most important of these solutions recommended the 
enactment of legislation to prohibit states from discriminating against potential homebuyers or 
renters if they received housing subsidized by the federal government.88  Nixon’s sentiments are 
surprising considering the change in his overall attitude and agenda towards his pursuit of 
moderate to liberal racial policies in the early months of 1970.  It is plausible that Nixon simply 
had not yet found the political opportunity to express his long-held opposition to enforcing civil 
rights legislation.  Nonetheless, Nixon dramatically altered his written position on housing policy 
by the time that he released the “Third Annual Report on Housing Goals,” to Congress on June 
29, 1971.  In this report, Nixon was noticeably silent on enforcing the Fair Housing Act to 
prevent racial discrimination or providing low-income individuals with additional assistance to 
acquire housing in middle-income communities.89  It is quite conceivable then, that Nixon was 
just slower in gauging how he could almost imperceptibly reverse his previous support for racial 
residential integration through the strict enforcement of the Fair Housing Act and placement of 
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low-income housing throughout the metropolitan region, and not solely in low-income, 
predominantly black, inner-city communities.   
 Despite the fact that Nixon’s stance on housing policy lagged behind his overall 
increasingly conservative position on race, it eventually became more consistent with his 
national agenda.  A January 2, 1971 Pittsburgh Courier article sheds light on Nixon’s efforts to 
publicly distance himself from Romney’s plans to encourage racial residential segregation.  
When questioned about the federal government’s role in aiding racial integration in suburbs, 
Nixon stated that the federal government should not “provide aid to housing or to urban renewal 
where a community has a policy of discrimination and has taken no steps to remove it.”90  He 
added, “I can assure you that it is not the policy of this government to use the power of the 
federal government or federal funds in any other way, in ways not required by the law for forced 
integration of the suburbs.”91  When read together, the statements underscore Nixon’s growing 
awareness of the political tightrope that he walked; he was aware that he had to appear to enforce 
the law as President of the United States while appearing to not aggressively enforce it in order 
to prevent white working-class voters from feeling alienated.   
 Additionally, Nixon’s more public commitment to preventing the “forced integration” of 
suburbs began to impact Romney’s tone and actions while pursuing his agenda.  An apparent 
impact that Nixon had on Romney’s agenda was causing him to reverse HUD’s ruling to deny 
Warren, Michigan its final installment of its $3.1 million in urban renewal funds due to the 
suburb’s history of racial discrimination and blatant disregard for HUD’s order to integrate.92   In 
addition to reversing HUD’s decision on Warren, Romney also contemplated changing HUD’s 
name, potentially with Nixon’s constituency in mind, even before his policies began to officially 
contradict Nixon’s views on housing policies.  At a press conference in mid-January 1971, 
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Romney stated that he would ask Congress to change HUD’s name from the Department of 
Housing and Urban Development to the Department of Housing and Community Development.93  
He declared: “This is the department of housing and community development because we’re just 
as concerned about the rural areas, the small towns and suburbs, as we are about the cities.”94  
Romney’s words could potentially serve as a reiteration of his “metropolitan-wide” approach as 
HUD Secretary.  Though, a more convincing interpretation is that his choice of words serves as 
an implicit message to white working-class voters that he was concerned with the rural and 
suburban neighborhoods in which white working-class Americans resided, as well.  To 
emphasize HUD’s commitment to serving “rural areas…small towns and suburbs” and not just 
cities serves to calm these voters’ anxieties about his agenda, Romney rhetorically placed his 
goals in line with Nixon’s.  Furthermore, Romney boldly declared that housing discrimination 
was in violation of the Fair Housing Act and advocated integrated suburbs as recent as June 1, 
1971, only a few weeks before Nixon would clearly state his opposition to “forced integration.”95   
Yet, by July 1971, pressure from Nixon more than likely caused Romney to propose policies that 
challenged racial segregation and less actively pursue policies that simultaneously addressed 
both racial and economic segregation.96  Romney even began to echo Nixon’s opposition to 
“forced integration” and strongly suggested that municipalities voluntarily integrate in order to 
avoid courts ordering them to do so, but did not mandate it, as he had done in the past.97  
Despite Romney’s more moderate tone, Nixon made it increasingly difficult for Romney 
to pursue his progressive agenda.  By August 1972, Romney and Nixon’s conflict began to 
escalate.  In the aftermath of the scandal that plagued the FHA because of suspected corruption 
and reinforcement of residential segregation in its Section 235 central city programs, Romney 
desperately attempted to discuss these issues with and request additional HUD staff from 
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President Nixon, in order to prevent additional scandals at HUD.98  Initially, Nixon appeared to 
acquiesce to Romney’s request for a meeting, but Romney had suspicions that Nixon ever 
acknowledged his request.   Romney stated that the President’s signature on a letter responding 
to his request “could have been stamped on.”99  Unsurprisingly, Nixon later cancelled his 
meeting with Romney, instead sending Romney to handle flood relief efforts in Wilkes-Barre, 
Pennsylvania to prevent bureaucratic problems from arising.100  Upon arriving in Wilkes-Barre, 
Romney had an altercation with Pennsylvania Governor Milton Shapp and a group of flood 
victims, most likely because Romney was convinced that HUD’s difficulty with responding to 
floods and other natural disasters was the result of the staffing problems that he had been 
pleading with Nixon to address since at least July 22, 1972.101  Nixon eventually responded to 
Romney’s request for a meeting on Friday, August 11, 1972.  While Romney left the meeting 
with the power to hire an additional 730 HUD employees, he made no reference to this 
development at his follow-up press conference.  Instead, he discussed resigning from HUD.   
Nixon and Romney’s conflict culminated when Nixon imposed an eighteen-month 
moratorium on funding for several of HUD’s programs including its subsidized housing 
programs and urban renewal commitments.102  The moratorium went into effect on January 1, 
1973, months after the Presidential Election of 1972, more than likely because there was no 
political risk for Nixon.103  Romney resigned on January 20, 1973 just as Nixon’s second term 
was beginning.104  Before his resignation in 1973, Romney expressed his frustration over HUD’s 
ineffectiveness, stating: “candidates for the Presidency were unwilling to discuss the ‘real issues’ 
facing the nation because of the fear that they would lose votes.”105  Unfortunately, the “real 
issues” of racial residential segregation, realtor steering, blockbusting, and the concentration of 
poverty in predominantly African-American neighborhoods would continue to plague American 
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society long after Romney’s resignation as Secretary of HUD.  These problems would persist as 
long as weak federal fair housing laws and politicians who lacked the political courage necessary 
to make real change continued to hold office.  Thus, Nixon’s targeting of Romney and HUD was 
part of his broader agenda to distance himself from liberal policies and figures in his Cabinet that 
risked Nixon’s alienation from white, working-class voters in the Presidential Election of 1972, 
and resulted in the removal of HUD’s most progressive Secretary in its organization history.  
 
Why George Romney was the Best Opportunity for Federal Desegregation Efforts  
Metrics of Housing Discrimination After Romney’s Departure from HUD 
 Despite Romney’s attempts to moderate his agenda in response to his conflicts with 
Nixon, his efforts were indeed the closest that the United States would ever come to achieving 
housing desegregation.  HUD’s agenda of its later years, which completely ignored racial 
residential integration, and its audit studies, completely support this notion.  Based on the results 
from HUD’s audit studies, outright denial of available housing in clear violation of the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, racial steering, and housing segregation were still rampant in the housing 
market well into the 1970s and 1980s.  These studies’ results also demonstrate that housing 
discrimination and segregation were prevalent decades after Romney’s tenure instead of 
declining, which underscore subsequent HUD Secretaries’ reluctance to address these issues as 
boldly as Romney.   
The first of these studies, HUD’s 1979 Housing Market Practices Survey (HMPS), exposed 
“extensive racial discrimination” in forty metropolitan areas throughout the United States.106  By 
using “simulated housing search experiment[s],” or test homebuying,107 the HMPS revealed, 
based on “an index of housing availability,” that African-Americans encountered discrimination 
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at a rate of twenty-seven percent in the rental market and seventy-two percent in the sales 
market. 108   In other words, African-American homebuyers faced some form of housing 
discrimination three-quarters of the time that they wanted to view or purchase homes.  
Additionally, African-American renters faced racial discrimination almost one out of three times 
that they viewed or rented an apartment.  The HMPS also revealed more specific statistics such 
as the rate at which realtors told black auditors that apartments were not available while telling 
white auditors that they were available and how often white auditors were favored in transactions 
over black auditors nationally.  These rates were thirty percent109 and forty-eight percent110 
respectively.  The HMPS concludes by acknowledging its deficiencies, such as the omission of a 
metric to measure racial steering111 and a sole focus on discrimination against blacks who live in 
metropolitan areas with significant percentages of other blacks.112  Equally important as the 
HMPS’s omissions were its admissions that “efforts to combat racial discrimination have not 
been successful,” “sanctions imposed on discriminators are insufficient,” and that 
“discriminatory behavior can be quite difficult to detect” with “treatment unfavorable to blacks 
can be confirmed only by examining a large number of cases.”113  Taken together, these excerpts 
reveal HUD’s acknowledgement that it lacked a reliable metric to measure and combat housing 
discrimination—as well as its admission of failure to stem the abuses it could measure.  It 
appears that only a few years after Romney’s failed, but valiant endeavor to monitor and respond 
to housing discrimination that his former organization had not learned from his efforts.  The next 
audit study, HUD’s 1991 Housing Discrimination Survey (HDS), would report similar levels of 
discrimination as its predecessor.   
 HUD’s 1991 HDS used similar methodology as the HMPS to assess discrimination in the 
housing market.  The HDS conducted 3,800 audits in 25 metropolitan areas during the late spring 
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and early summer of 1989 and reported some fairly widespread instances of discrimination.  The 
study revealed that realtors lied to black and Latino auditors about houses’ availability at the 
equal rate of eight percent.114  For rental audits, twelve percent of the Latino auditors and fifteen 
percent of black auditors were “denied the opportunity to meet sales or rental agents or were told 
that nothing was available, even though units were made available to comparable white 
Anglos.”115  Another statistic pertained to racial steering.  The study observed: “the probability 
of steering is 21 percent for both black and Hispanic homebuyers…the houses shown or 
recommended to minority buyers are in neighborhoods that are lower percent white (by at least 5 
percentage points), lower per capita income (by at least $2,500), or lower median house value 
(by at least $5,000).”116   In other words, realtors typically showed minority homebuyers homes 
in neighborhoods that were more likely to be less white, low-income, and have lower home 
values.  Equally alarming was the HDS’s claim that the “severity” of racial steering was not as 
harsh as it could have been because the HDS was restricted to conducting its audits in 
predominantly white neighborhoods due to the fact that “few integrated and majority black or 
Hispanic neighborhoods…were advertised in major metropolitan newspapers.” 117   Racial 
steering and the dearth of advertising for homes in minority and integrated communities 
underscore the more subtle ways in which racial residential segregation is maintained after the 
ban on more overt forms of discrimination.    
 Racial steering and other forms of housing discrimination reveal how racial residential 
segregation has become normative in American society.  As a practice, racial steering is rooted 
in the assumption that racial minorities should live in neighborhoods separate from whites with 
high percentages of other racial minorities.  This practice results from some white realtors’ 
internalization of the stereotype that the presence of racial minorities in a predominantly white 
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neighborhood will destabilize a neighborhood’s property values.118  In addition to separating the 
races, racial steering has disastrous effects on racial minorities.  Because realtors in this study 
showed many black and Latino auditors apartments and houses in neighborhoods that had lower 
home values, were less affluent, and had higher percentages of minorities, the HDS reveals 
realtors’ subtle mechanisms of propagating inequality by ensuring that racial minorities continue 
to live in impoverished neighborhoods with access to fewer goods and services.119  Furthermore, 
newspapers’ failure to advertise available homes in integrated and minority communities 
perpetuates a cycle of segregation by encouraging whites to reside in predominantly white 
communities instead of considering homes in integrated or minority communities.  
 Housing discrimination and the normalization of the inequalities that these practices 
produce can be best understood through an examination of the role that white privilege plays in 
these actions.  David Roediger’s The Wages of Whiteness provides an excellent definition of 
white privilege, defining it as the “status and privileges conferred by race.”120   Drawing on the 
theory first articulated by W.E.B. Du Bois in Black Reconstruction, Roediger describes the 
“status and privileges” associated with whiteness as ascribed in almost every social institution 
ranging from employment, to public office, to the judicial system.121  The privileges that whites 
obtained in these respective spheres over non-whites became fiercely guarded, and later 
naturalized in American society.  Cheryl Harris adds to Roediger’s definition, stating: “The set of 
assumptions, privileges, and benefits that accompany the status of being white have become a 
valuable asset that whites sought to protect…whites have come to expect and rely on these 
benefits, and over time, these expectations have been affirmed, legitimated, and protected by 
law.” 122   Both scholars’ definitions of white privilege can be observed in some white 
homeowners’ expectation that they will have access to predominantly white neighborhoods, with 
 32 
a low population of people of color, and access to the best amenities.123  White homeowners’ fear 
of residing in the same neighborhoods as African-Americans and some white realtors’ steering of 
white prospective homeowners into predominantly white neighborhoods and African-American 
prospective homeowners into predominantly black neighborhoods can be understood as the 
manifestation of white privilege in the housing market.  Because white privilege is the norm, it is 
largely unquestioned, and little has been done to challenge or examine its existence in the 
housing market.  Therefore, one of the important conclusions from the HDS study is the extreme 
degree of difficulty in eradicating white privilege from the housing market, despite the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968.    
  Overall, the HDS’s statistics reveal that housing market discrimination was still quite 
prevalent in 1991 and again, that HUD still lacked the enforcement mechanisms to curtail this 
discrimination.  The statistics from the HMPS and the HDS raise the question: why did 
discrimination in the housing market continue to run rampant, virtually unchecked?  Why were 
HUD officials reluctant to pursue more effective methods to eradicate housing segregation?  An 
examination of some of HUD’s policies at the federal level during the 1970s and 1990s provides 
answers to both questions.     
 
HUD’s Insufficient Attempts to Mitigate Housing Desegregation in Later Years 
After Romney resigned as Secretary of HUD and Nixon imposed a moratorium on 
HUD’s funding, the agency chose to pursue a less sweeping, uncontroversial agenda to increase 
Americans’ access to homeownership.  Some of HUD’s later initiatives included the Federal 
Experimental Housing Allowance Program and the Housing and Community Development Act 
of 1974, which, among other measures, created the Section 8 program.  These initiatives mirror 
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Weaver’s initiatives as the first Secretary of HUD in that they provide aid to some low-income 
African-Americans in cities, but they do not alleviate the conditions that produced their poverty: 
racial residential segregation.  Conspicuously absent from HUD’s major initiatives was a plan 
explicitly dedicated to ensuring fair housing.  
Programs that HUD initiated during the 1990s intended to be more sweeping in scope, 
but ultimately, they still had limited, if not undesirable effects.  For example, Housing 
Opportunities for People Everywhere (VI)—or HOPE VI—a program that was conceived of in 
1992, offered a flawed solution to residential segregation.  Created as a result of the National 
Commission on Severely Distressed Public Housing’s 1989 recommendation to “eradicate 
severely distressed public housing by the year 2000,” 124  HOPE VI was dedicated to 
“redeveloping distressed public housing and neighborhoods into mixed-income communities.”125  
Unfortunately, HOPE VI’s results fell short of its ambitious goals due to circumstances that 
prevented the full rehabilitation of public housing developments.  In accordance with the 
Housing and Community Development Act of 1987, HOPE VI intended to redevelop public 
housing units by demolishing one unit of public housing and replacing each unit with one new 
unit of affordable housing.126  However, HOPE VI’s objectives were not brought to fruition.  As 
a result of the Republican-controlled 104th Congress’s obstruction of numerous pieces of 
expensive, transformative legislation, many federal agencies’ ability to enact sweeping reform 
was limited, and HUD Secretary Henry Cisneros was forced to abandon his original goal of 
renovating many of the nation’s deteriorating public housing projects.127  Consequently, HUD 
was forced to shift to the right on policy issues, and Cisneros demolished approximately 23,000 
public housing units by the end of 1996 without making provisions to allow HOPE VI to provide 
funding to replace the housing that it destroyed.128  As a result, public housing authorities in 
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numerous cities were left to seek their own funding to replace demolished housing.  HOPE VI 
failed to de-concentrate poverty by relocating a minority of displaced residents to environments 
with lower concentrations of poverty with housing vouchers, while approximately fifty percent 
of residents were simply relocated to other public housing developments.129  In other words, 
these displaced public housing residents often relocated to neighborhoods with just as high 
concentrations of poverty as the neighborhoods from which they were displaced.  Consequently, 
HOPE VI’s impact mirrored urban renewal’s disparate displacement of minority residents from 
their homes and therefore can be interpreted as a more recent version of urban renewal.   
Another HUD-initiated program called Moving to Opportunity for Fair Housing (MTO), 
would not have HOPE VI’s negative effects but would also fall short of its potential.  Inspired by 
the precedent set by the Supreme Court case Gautreaux et.al v. Chicago, and in accordance with 
the Housing and Community Development Act of 1992, MTO tested the effectiveness of 
improving the life chances of low-income African-Americans by relocating them from 
neighborhoods with high concentrations of poverty to neighborhoods with lower concentrations 
of poverty.  Operating from 1994 to 1998, the program selected 4,604 low-income families from 
Baltimore, Boston, Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City.130  Eligibility for MTO was 
limited to individuals and families who lived in public housing or who relied on government-
subsidized housing.  The 4,604 families were divided into three groups: an experimental group 
that received mobility counseling and received Section 8 certificates that could only be used to 
relocate to neighborhoods with a less than 10 percent poverty rates; “a section 8 only group” that 
only received Section 8 vouchers that could be used to move to any location; and the control 
group, which did not receive any certificates or vouchers through MTO, but was still eligible for 
public housing or public assistance.131  A follow-up survey was conducted with the program’s 
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participants in 2007, years after the program had ended.  The survey revealed that control group 
participants resided in neighborhoods with only slightly less racial segregation than the 
neighborhoods in which they had previously resided.132  Furthermore, while many more families 
were employed, had higher incomes, and were less likely to receive welfare, these changes were 
approximately equal for control group and non-control group families.  Both groups represented 
extremes in the experiment, but yet had similar outcomes.  Overall, MTO generated few 
detectable, long-term effects on adults and youths’ economic self-sufficiency.133  Thus, instead 
of combatting the negative effects associated with residential segregation, MTO was another 
opportunity where HUD failed to confront racial residential segregation. 
The Secretaries of HUD who succeeded Romney did some political calculus, and decided 
to settle for less radical reforms than residential integration within the stifling political context 
that existed for change.  Appointed in 1997, Andrew Cuomo tried to enact tangible change for 
minority homebuyers by pursuing policies that intended to abate lending institutions’ history of 
discrimination against non-whites.  More specifically, Cuomo encouraged government-
sponsored banks, the Federal Loan Mortgage Corporation and the Federal National Mortgage 
Association, commonly referred to as Freddie Mac and Fannie Mac, to purchase loans taken out 
by working-class homeowners.134  While Cuomo’s intentions seemed benevolent, his actions 
may have contributed to the burgeoning subprime mortgage market.135  Mortgage bankers and 
brokers specifically targeted some members of racial minority groups and low-income 
individuals who they knew did not normally qualify for these mortgages due to poor credit.  
These bankers and brokers provided mortgages to individuals who were unqualified to receive 
mortgages so that they could profit from the subprime mortgages that they sold their clients. 136 
When presented with the opportunity to penalize the banks that engaged in predatory lending, 
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Cuomo did not listen to local officials who advised him to force Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac to 
report details about the loans that they bought.137 Cuomo also chose not impose penalties on 
large banks to deter them from continuing their predatory lending practices.138  Thus, Cuomo’s 
attempts to aid low-income individuals and racial minorities, combined with his reluctance to 
punish guilty financial institutions for their misconduct, resulted in low-income and non-white 
Americans’ continued victimization at the hands of the financial industry.     
One of Cuomo’s successors, Alphonso Jackson, also tried to affect limited change as 
Secretary of HUD.  While Secretary of HUD from 2004 to 2008, Jackson created minimal 
change for low-income individuals and racial minorities.  During Jackson’s tenure, HUD 
decreased the number of chronically homeless people in 1,500 cities by 11.5% between 2005 and 
2006.139  Some of the methods that HUD used to achieve this goal included prioritizing 
permanent housing for the homeless, funding 60,000 new units of housing since 2001, and 
increasing its homeless budget by 41%, in order for local communities to have additional 
resources to have more resources to aid the homeless.140  In addition to supporting the most 
economically disadvantaged members of society, Jackson also aided racial minorities, albeit in 
less meaningful ways.  During his term, Jackson awarded 26.5%, or $800 million, of HUD’s 
contracts to black and Latino-owned businesses.141  While both of Jackson’s policies were well 
intentioned, they did not have as great of a scope as they could have had.  His policies were not 
intended to completely eradicate the source of poverty that causes homelessness or the root of 
racial residential segregation and racial discrimination that historically resulted in substantial 
differences in the black-white wealth gap.  The respective policies benefitted the homeless 
individuals and the minority contractors who were fortunate enough to benefit from them instead 
of their respective groups as a whole.  Because of HUD’s reluctance to create federal programs 
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to react to fair housing policy, it is safe to say that, although flawed, Romney’s efforts were the 
closest that HUD would come to achieving fair housing at the federal level because Romney was 
willing to take the political risk to both monitor and effectively respond to racial residential 
segregation.  
 
Potential Solutions Based on Integrated Communities 
 Although HUD’s recent agenda has lacked efforts to encourage racial integration at the 
federal level, various integrated communities could serve as models for HUD to mount a federal 
challenge to racial residential segregation.  One community that serves as a local model for HUD 
is the community of Oak Park, Illinois.  According to the 2010 U.S. Census, Oak Park, Illinois 
boasts a total population of 51,878, and its residents are 67.7% white, 21.7% black, 4.8% Asian, 
and 6.8 % Latino.142  Oak Park’s impressive statistics were the result of residents’ careful, 
intentional efforts to achieve integration since the 1960s.  However, prior to the 1960s, Oak Park 
was another predominantly white suburb that had little incentive to integrate.  In fact, some white 
Oak Park residents even violently resisted when renowned African-American chemist, Dr. Percy 
Julian, moved into the historic section of Oak Park, which prides itself on being replete with 
homes designed by famed architect Frank Lloyd Wright.143  These white Oak Parkers did not just 
resist, but specifically, they tried and failed twice to set Julian’s house on fire before he moved 
into this exclusive, Oak Park neighborhood in 1950.144  This incident of racial violence is 
unsurprising considering that Oak Park had a total white population of 63,382 and a total black 
population of 75 in 1950.145  Clearly, Oak Park was overwhelmingly white and had a long way to 
go before achieving integration.  While some sign of a burgeoning white progressive movement 
in Oak Park can be viewed through the existence of “‘a church vigilante group’” that “guarded 
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Julian’s home for more than two months,” real change surrounding race in the community would 
not come until the 1960s.146   
 In 1963, the dismissal of an African-American violinist from the Oak Park Symphony 
Orchestra forever altered the community’s history.  An African-American violinist named Carol 
Anderson auditioned for the orchestra, but was rejected due to her race.  The orchestra board’s 
chairman claimed that Anderson “was not acceptable because she was a Negro.”147  After the 
orchestra’s conductor, Milton Preves, invited Anderson to sit in on the orchestra’s rehearsal on 
December 4, 1962, she received a phone call from Mrs. Gustave M. Palmer, the Chairman of the 
Symphony Association of suburban Oak Park and River Forest.  Mrs. Palmer informed Anderson 
that she would not be allowed to perform because “the community would then withdraw its 
support from the orchestra.”148  Over the course of the first few months of 1963, several 
individuals and institutions in Oak Park condemned Palmer for rejecting Anderson due to her 
race, including Preves, who later resigned, as well as Oak Park’s governing body, the Oak Park 
Village Board, and the Oak Park School Board, which would not allow the Symphony Orchestra 
to hold its concerts in the school auditorium unless she was allowed to perform on Sunday, 
February 13th.149  Lastly, a group of twenty-five Oak Park and River Forest 150 clergymen of 
different faiths threatened to withdraw their support from the orchestra unless Anderson was 
allowed to perform on February 13th. 151  Ultimately, pressure from various groups caused the 
Symphony Board to issue an apology to Anderson.  While these events were important because 
they denote a minor change in Oak Park’s treatment of African-Americans, they are also 
significant because they reveal how white Oak Park residents’ concern with their image as racist 
and sensitivity to criticism would make the community receptive to change in later years.  
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Carol Anderson’s dismissal from the Oak Park Symphony Orchestra combined with other 
factors compelled Oak Park residents to take more concrete action in response to racial 
discrimination.152  Sometime after this racial incident, some residents of Oak Park voluntarily 
formed the Citizens Committee for Human Rights, which addressed issues related to integration.  
The Committee placed an advertisement in support of integration in one of Oak Park’s local 
newspapers, called Oak Leaves.  Their ad entitled, “The right of all people to live where they 
choose,” expressed pro-integration and pro-diversity sentiments, stating:  
“[W]e want residence in our Villages to be open to anyone interested in sharing our 
benefits and responsibilities, regardless of race, color, creed, or national origin. That we 
believe in equal opportunity for all in the fields of education, business, and the 
professions, in harmony with constitutional guarantees of equal rights to life, liberty, and 
the pursuit of happiness.”153  
 
This excerpt is significant because it marks a clear divergence from the lack of community 
response to the racism that resulted in the failed firebombing of Dr. Percy Julian’s home in 1950.  
It also underscores the greater community support for integration that existed, given that the ad 
was paid for and signed by over one thousand residents.154  However, Oak Park’s newfound 
commitment to integration was not entirely altruistic.  Residents were concerned that Oak Park 
would continue to suffer violent resistance to changing racial demographics, and wanted to 
present itself as a “notch or two more enlightened than” its neighboring communities of Cicero 
and Berwyn, where white residents reacted violently in response to blacks entering their 
respective communities. 155  Despite Oak Park residents’ concerns, demographic shifts in Cicero 
and Berwyn did not support their fears.  In 1950, Berwyn’s total population was 51,280.  Its total 
white population was 51,255, and its total black population was 7.156  That same year, Cicero’s 
total population was 67,544.  The total white population was 67,489 and the total black 
population was 30.157  In 1960, Berwyn’s total population was 54,224.  Its total white population 
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was 52,271 and its total black population was unknown, but its total black female population was 
6.158  In 1960, Cicero’s total population was 69,130.  Its total white population was 69,092 and 
its total black population was 4.159  In 1970, Berwyn’s total population was 52,502.  Its total 
white population was 52,317 and its total black population was 8.160  In 1970, Cicero’s total 
population was 67,058.  Its total white population was 66,831 and its total black population was 
5.161  From 1950 through 1970, Berwyn’s white population increased.  During this same time 
period, Cicero’s white population and its black population declined.  Additionally, residents were 
concerned about how to best manage the black population from the nearby ghetto of the Austin 
neighborhood of Chicago, which threatened to overflow into Oak Park.162  White Oak Park 
residents were faced with the familiar choices of preventing blacks from residing in their 
community or fleeing.   
Nevertheless, the twin impetuses posed by the negative attention garnered by Anderson’s 
rejection from the Symphony Orchestra and the fear that similar unstable racial transition would 
take place in Oak Park caused residents to desire to distance themselves from Austin, as well as 
neighboring communities of Cicero and Berwyn’s unstable racial transition.  Subsequently, Oak 
Parkers began to view themselves as “liberal, open-minded, egalitarian” and supportive of “a 
stable integrated community.”163  Evidence of this idea is apparent in the enactment of Oak 
Park’s fair housing ordinance on May 6, 1968, coincidentally and only one month after the 
enactment of federal legislation in the form of the Fair Housing Act on April 11, 1968.164  Only a 
few years later, in 1973, the Oak Park Village Board adopted its “Diversity Statement,” which 
affirmed the village’s commitment to “equality, not because it is legal but because it is right,” 
and declared that diversity “is Oak Park’s strength.”165 Furthermore, various organizations 
proliferated to help achieve stable residential integration during the 1960s and 1970s.  Some of 
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the most influential organizations to help achieve racial integration include the Oak Park 
Community Relations Commission and the Oak Park Housing Center.  The Oak Park 
Community Relations Commission166 formed in 1963 in response to Anderson’s rejection from 
the Oak Park Symphony Orchestra.167  However, the Community Relations Commission did not 
truly commit to changing Oak Park’s racial climate until 1973.  In 1973, the Commission began 
a test homebuying program.168  That same year, the Commission also served as a mediator to 
diffuse potentially racially tense situations as white Oak Park residents became more acutely 
aware of blacks moving into the southeast section of the community.169  The Commission’s 
efforts were bolstered by the Oak Park Housing Center’s agenda.   
Founded on May 1, 1972, the Housing Center used a variety of methods to prevent white 
flight and attract liberal whites to the suburb.170  Some of these methods included specialized 
advertisements in national and metropolitan newspapers such as Chicago magazine, Ms., Reader, 
and Saturday Review, aimed towards young, white, liberal upwardly mobile families to attract 
them to Oak Park.171  Additionally, the Housing Center monitored local realtors’ and lending 
companies’ practices to prevent housing discrimination and discriminatory lending.172  More 
controversial initiatives included placing a “30 percent quota on the blacks who could live in 
southeastern Oak Park;” which bordered the predominantly black neighborhood of Austin, 
Chicago, in the hope of preventing white flight;173 allowing residents to enroll in an equity 
assurance program that would “reimburse them for up to 80 percent of any losses incurred in the 
sale of their homes after five years;”174 encouraging white homebuyers to settle in predominantly 
black neighborhoods and black homebuyers to settle throughout the community in order to 
prevent re-segregation;175 and providing landlords with subsidies and grants to integrate their 
apartment complexes.176  The first two initiatives were clearly intended to ease white residents’ 
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fears and prevent them from leaving the community.  The second initiative was also meant to 
simultaneously justify and combat some whites’ fears that living in a racially integrated 
community would lead to diminished property values.  The third initiative’s intention was to 
prevent predominantly white or black sections of Oak Park from forming, as well as white flight 
and re-segregation of neighborhoods into black or white enclaves.  The last initiative intended to 
make integration financially advantageous.  All of these pro-integrative measures led to an 
increasingly diverse population in Oak Park over the next few decades.  In 1970, prior to the 
Housing Center and Community Relations Commission’s efforts, Oak Park had a total 
population of 62,511; 98.8% of its residents were white and .002% of its residents were black.177  
By 1980, the total population was 54,887.  85.1% of its residents were white, 10.8% of its 
residents were black, .001% of its population was American Indian, and .02% of its residents 
were Asian.178  In 1990, Oak Park’s total population was 53,548.  77.1% of its residents were 
white, 18.3% of its residents were black, 3.3% of its population was Asian, and 0.13% of its 
population was American Indian.179  By 2000, there was a total population of 52,524. 68.7% of 
its residents were white, 22.4% of its residents were black, 4% of its residents were Asian, and 
0.15% of its population was American Indian.180  Thus, Oak Park’s population change from 1970 
to 2000 reveals that its strategies to prevent white flight and achieve intentional, stable racial 
integration into the present have been successful.   
Another example of a community that successfully achieved racial residential integration 
is the suburb of South Orange, New Jersey.  With a current total population of 16,198, 60.1% of 
South Orange’s residents are white, 28.6% are black, 6.1% are Latino, and 5.1% are Asian.181 
With a total population of less than 17,000 residents, community organizations were able to 
closely monitor efforts to encourage integration at the local level.  Recent organizations such as 
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South Orange Neighbors, Friends and Neighbors, and the Maplewood/South Orange Racial 
Balance Task Force made attempts to integrate South Orange, but the organization that had the 
greatest impact on South Orange’s integration was the South Orange/Maplewood Community 
Coalition on Race.  Concerned with avoiding the “tipping point,”182 as South Orange’s African-
American population began to gradually increase from 10% in 1980 to 18.6% in 1990,183 
residents and community leaders created a more detailed plan to ensure that South Orange 
underwent a stable integration.   
The direct precursor to the South Orange/Maplewood Community Coalition on Race, the 
Maplewood/South Orange Racial Balance Task Force had the greatest success in creating 
measures to intentionally integrate the town.  Formed in May 1997, the Task Force enlisted the 
help of Donald “Don” DeMarco, the then Executive Director of Fund for an Open Society, an 
organization that works to create racially and ethnically integrated communities, 184  who 
previously used the strategy of “integration maintenance” to diversify the communities of Shaker 
Heights, Ohio and Oak Park, Illinois.185 Some of the Task Force’s strategies to achieve 
integration included placing advertisements that catered to liberal, white populations in 
communities like Park Slope, Brooklyn, who value diversity, in newspapers like the New York 
Times, while rarely mentioning the community’s racial composition in the majority of 
advertisements that it placed in other newspapers.  Instead, the advertisements focused on the 
community’s positive attributes, such as excellent schools and the community’s attractiveness, 
qualities that appeal to prospective homeowners of all backgrounds.186  The difference in 
advertising was not meant to be deceptive, but rather was developed in this manner because 
many white Americans may not view themselves as “an ingredient of diversity.”187  Another 
strategy that the Task Force, which by 1999 had changed its name to the South 
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Orange/Maplewood Community Coalition on Race, used to intentionally integrate South Orange 
and Maplewood was continuing Friends and Neighbors’ legacy of providing community tours to 
potential homebuyers.  The tours were led by the two towns’ residents to offer prospective 
homebuyers an understanding of the different neighborhoods in the community before they meet 
with realtors to purchase homes.  By providing prospective homebuyers with an overview of the 
community prior to meeting with a realtor, prospective homebuyers have the opportunity to 
become familiar with different sections of the community before realtors show them different 
homes.  Therefore, prospective homebuyers in South Orange would be more aware than the 
average homebuyer if they had been steered even before purchasing homes.  These initiatives 
ultimately proved to be lucrative for South Orange, New Jersey.  A ten-year analysis conducted 
by the Maplewood/South Orange Racial Balance Task Force and continued by the South 
Orange/Maplewood Community Coalition on Race was released in 2006.188  The analysis 
revealed that “the selling price of a single-family home versus its assessed land 
value…appreciated 193.5% and 192.9% in Maplewood and South Orange,” respectively.189  
Based on these data, it appears that the town of South Orange, and its neighboring town of 
Maplewood, were able to increase their property values because of their ability to include people 
of different backgrounds in the housing market; this sense of inclusion resulted in tools that 
prevented white homeowners from selling their homes below market value and subsequently, 
causing property values to decline.190  Examining Oak Park and South Orange’s examples of 
intentional integration in order to stabilize/increase property values alongside Romney’s failed 
attempt to create integration at the Federal level can offer solutions on how to achieve housing 
integration at the Federal level in the present through providing potential economic incentives for 
integration.   
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Potential Solutions at the Federal Level in the Present 
By comparing Romney’s tenure as Secretary of HUD with the example set by integrated 
communities like Oak Park, Illinois and South Orange, New Jersey and some of the suggestions 
made by Douglas Massey and Nancy Denton, new solutions for residential integration at the 
federal level emerge.  For instance, Romney’s tenure as Secretary of HUD is a teachable moment 
because it offers an example of how not to apply affirmative action to housing.  Instead of 
following Romney’s example of solely punishing municipalities in order to enforce the Fair 
Housing Act of 1968, the current Secretary of HUD, Shaun Donovan, could follow Oak Park’s 
example and offer financial incentives for municipalities to integrate their communities.  
Municipalities that make a genuine effort to follow federal goals and timetables for diversifying 
their communities could receive lower interest rates for FHA mortgages as well as tax breaks for 
every year that they maintain a stable level of integration.  This incentive should also hopefully 
cut down on realtor steering because it challenges the pernicious myth set forth by the real estate 
industry that the presence of minorities in particular communities is harmful to property values.  
This incentive makes it valuable for communities to voluntarily integrate and for realtors to 
support this effort.  In the event that realtors continue this illegal practice in spite of potential 
financial motives to not do so, I propose another feasible solution to respond to realtor steering.  
Borrowing from Massey and Denton, I suggest that local fair housing organizations partner with 
HUD to identify and sanction realtors who continue to racially steer white and black potential 
homebuyers.  These aforementioned initiatives could be supplemented by Massey and Denton’s 
suggestion to provide federal aid to fair housing programs.  Doing so would ensure that the 
methods that integrated communities like Oak Park, Illinois and South Orange, New Jersey, have 
undertaken at the local level can be supported and maintained at the federal level, and also make 
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it lucrative for communities to intentionally integrate.  The one flaw in Massey and Denton’s 
proposals lies in their plan to promote desegregation through voucher programs.  Given the 
questionable effectiveness of HOPE VI and MTO, these programs may not have the necessary, 
widespread results to achieve the level of integration that they suggest.  However, their last 
proposal seems very promising.  The scholars’ suggestion of expediting the judicial process 
combined with severe penalties for the municipalities, realtors, and homeowners involved with 
preventing residential integration or failing to integrate based on specific timetables set by the 
Secretary of HUD would prove to be an effective means to make it undesirable to commit acts of 
housing discrimination.  A combination of all of these solutions at the federal level may finally 
result in decreased rates of racial residential segregation.    
 
Conclusion 
 Racial residential segregation is a pernicious force in American society.  Created and 
maintained by the federal government, local and state governments, and some white 
homeowners, racial residential segregation has mapped itself on to the geographies of numerous 
metropolitan regions.  This segregation has not only resulted in the separation of black and white 
homeowners, but more importantly, the concentration of poverty in low-income, inner-city 
African-American communities.  Although George Romney’s tenure as Secretary of HUD 
represented a brief opportunity for HUD to eradicate housing segregation, his efforts largely 
went un-supplemented by HUD’s subsequent agenda.  Even HUD’s successive attempts to de-
concentrate poverty in minority communities and relocate minorities to predominantly white 
neighborhoods with access to better goods and services through HUD-sponsored programs like 
HOPE VI and MTO did not create as much change as they had intended.  If HUD learns from 
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integrated communities like Oak Park, Illinois and South Orange, New Jersey, and applies their 
local strategies at the federal level, there may be a chance that substantial housing desegregation 
can occur not just at the local level, but also at the federal level, through the possibility that racial 
integration occurs throughout several major metropolitan regions.  However, what is known, is 
that if HUD were to more aggressively incentivize integration and castigate newer, more subtle 
forms of discrimination that persist after the enactment of the Fair Housing Act of 1968, racial 
residential segregation stands a strong chance of being eradicated.   
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